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Executive summary 
1. This report was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to whom most of 
the recommendations are addressed. The analysis and the views expressed are those of the 
authors and should not be construed to reflect the views or policies of the Norwegian 
government, the EAC or any of the East African partner governments. 
2. The long history of collaboration between the three East African states with its ups and downs 
has left a legacy – for good and bad. This legacy has a bearing on the contemporary dynamics 
of collaboration in several respects. The processes and experiences leading up to the collapse of 
the Community in 1977 still linger in the minds of politicians and civil servants. On the 
negative side a certain amount of scepticism remains on the part of Tanzania and Uganda vis-à-
vis Kenya on account of the widespread perception that Kenya benefited disproportionately 
from regional co-operation at the expense of the other partners. 
3. Although there is no denying that a historical legacy exists, the current situation is 
fundamentally different from that obtaining nearly 30 years ago. The thrust of the new Treaty 
assumes an entirely different orientation, largely reflecting the changing trends of political and 
economic reform in the past two decades. Governance issues have moved higher up on the 
agenda. In the economic sphere the role of the state has been reduced and changed in nature. 
The state is currently seen rather as a facilitator through the creation of an enabling environment 
conducive to economic growth. The private sector is given a greater role in production and 
distribution without undue interference by the state. 
4. The regional integration project has progressed considerably. The major achievement is the 
conclusion of a customs union protocol which entered into force at the beginning of 2005. In 
other fields the rate of progress has also been impressive, albeit variable. 
5. Notwithstanding notable progress in a range of fields, the Heads of State of the three partner 
countries have expressed concern that the rate of progress was too slow. Consequently, they 
appointed a committee to look into the possibility of fast-tracking the integration process. The 
committee’s report was submitted on 26 November 2004. The present report assesses the 
realism and feasibility of the recommendations and time schedule suggested by the fast-track 
committee. Our findings are based on perusal of documents and personal interviews with 63 
respondents representing a varity of stakeholders. 
6. Essentially, there are two approaches to regional integration. One is associated with the late 
president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, who considered paramount political institutions as 
useful vehicles for bringing about integration in other spheres. At the other extreme is the 
functionalist approach whereby regional integration is promoted piecemeal through gradual 
steps to building a web of functional relations in trade, investment, infrastructure, culture, etc. 
In this building-block approach the political superstructure, such as a political federation, would 
be considered the logical culmination of the integration process from below. Both of these 
differing strands of thinking appear to be alive in East Africa today, although the faith in 
building blocks takes the upper hand. 
7. A federation is defined as a compound polity combining constituent units (currently Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda in the case of East Africa, and later possibly also including Rwanda and 
Burundi) and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by its people 
through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a 
significant portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected 
by its citizens. 
8. A major reason why federal arrangements fail to produce stability and prosperity can be found 
in the distribution of costs and benefits among the constituent units. Sovereign territorial states 
enter into co-operative arrangements and have expectations of gain. Over time these 
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expectations must be fulfilled, at least in part. Although short-term losses are weighed against 
long-term benefits, the net long-term benefits must be pos itive. Otherwise a co-operative 
venture would surely die or soon become moribund. 
9. The fast-track committee recommended its own second, middle -of-the-road option: overlapping 
and parallel processes of integration. It discarded the compression of the stages of integration 
and shied away from immediately establishing the ‘political kingdom’ in the form of a political 
federation. The first preparatory phase would address the institutional framework and financial 
inputs required to move to the next phase. The second transitional phase (2006-2009) would 
comprise the implementation of the customs union, the common market and the monetary union 
– the substance of economic integration. A measure of success in these substantive elements in 
the economic sphere was in turn regarded as the foundation of a political federation. Other 
substantive components include progress in infrastructure, science and technology, 
constitutional and financial issues. The launching date for the political federation was set at 1 
January 2010, at which time a federal president is expected to be sworn in. 
10. The committee’s review of the situation highlighted both achievements and challenges in a 
remarkably frank and self-critical fashion. It noted and lamented the lack of a politically 
accountable authority at the regional level; the lack of clearly defined roles for the East African 
Legislative Assembly and the East African Court of Justice in contributing to the integration 
endeavour; the practice that EAC secretariat staff prepare EAC budgets on the basis of 
ministerial ceilings in national budgets; the tardiness of some partner states in remitting their 
contributions; the unduly complex and time-consuming procurement procedures; the lack of 
sanctions mechanism when commitments are not honoured, implementation is slow due 
resistance by high-level bureaucrats, when partners states backtrack on decisions taken, etc. 
11. It also cited as a source of concern that currently donors contribute 27 per cent of the EAC 
secretariat’s budget. Given that the secretariat is overstretched and poised to expand in the 
future to handle an increasing number of tasks, it is mandatory that better financing 
arrangements be instituted to avoid even greater donor dependency. 
12. The three partner countries ratified the customs union protocol on 30 November, 2004 which is 
to be implemented over a five-year term which started in January 2005. The objectives spelled 
out in the protocol include the liberalisation of the intra-regional trade regime on the basis 
mutual benefit, promotion of efficiency in production within the Community, and the promotion 
of economic development and industrial diversification. The protocol provides for the 
establishment of a common external tariff (CET), trade remedies and the prevention, 
investigation and suppression of custom offences, and collection of customs duty by adopting a 
uniform standard of valuation of goods. 
13. During the initial implementation period of the custom union, several problems have been 
encountered: (a) non-tariff barriers such as customs, immigration, administrative procedures 
and regulations and licenses, have not been fully eliminated and negatively impact on trade and 
co-operation; (b) the protocol does not encompass the private sector in the process of 
implementation; (c) the issue of dynamic gains/losses from trade liberalisation has not been 
clear since the inception of the customs union; (d) the protocol does not incorporate the impact 
of imperfect competition; (e) key issues such as protection of manufacturing sectors, 
disharmony in tax subsidies and unstable macro-economic environments remain unresolved; (f) 
the exemption regime under the East Africa Community Customs Management Act 2004 seems 
to have created controversy relating to the CET structure on grains such as wheat, barley, non-
governmental organisations, agricultural and horticultural inputs; (g) the CET structure is not 
consistent with the tax structures in the individual partner countries, and (h) membership in 
multiple regional trading blocs has yet to be resolved. As long as these problems remain 
unresolved, it is difficult to adhere strictly to the implementation time-scale. 
14. After the customs union, the partner states are expected to progress to a common market, which 
entails improved macro-economic policy synchronisation and co-ordination, especially the 
fiscal regimes. Furthermore, a pre-requisite for achieving common market status is the easing of 
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border-crossing by citizens of the partner states and the harmonisation and maintenance of 
uniform employment/labour policies, programmes and legislation. The fast-track report 
highlighted that there were delayed negotiations on the protocol on free movement of persons, 
the structure of legal and administrative of partners varied considerably, and there is currently 
no framework that can facilitate labour migration or movement of persons, goods, and services. 
It is therefore prudent to conclude that given the dynamics and the complexity of achieving a 
common market, the 2007 deadline is over-ambitious. 
15. The views expressed by various stakeholders unambiguously lead to the conclusion that: (i) a 
customs union and a common market are definitely beneficial for the region and hence a 
common market goal should be supported, enhanced and nurtured over a much longer time than 
prescribed in the fast-track report; (ii) a lot of commendable progress has been made, especially 
with regard to the customs union protocol but the time frame is definitely not realistic; (iii) there 
exists asymmetry in both the political and economic realms of the three countries; (iv) there is 
need to take time and deliberately work on economic policy convergence modalities as well as 
building a common institutional framework to facilitate and co-ordinate market integration; (iv) 
there are transitional elements, issues and perceptions associated with a faster integration 
process which need to be identified and addressed; (v) discussion about the implementation of 
the customs union and the protocols for the common market are left to government bureaucrats 
who do not have authority to make real decisions; (iv) there is lack of well researched and 
analysed empirical evidence on key issues to inform decisions, leaving critical decisions to be 
made on the basis of perceptions; and (viii) a longer time frame is necessary, say 20-25 years, to 
achieve a functional and sustainable common market with the full realisation of a customs 
union in 15 to 20 years; and (viii) there are transitional issues, e.g. differences in the pace of 
implementation of agreed activities, which must be solved. 
16. A monetary union has the following characteristics: (i) a single or several currencies fully 
convertible at immutably fixed exchange rates; (ii) an arrangement whereby monetary policy is 
determined at the union level, allowing no national autonomy in monetary policy; and (iii) a 
single exchange rate policy with a common pool of external reserves of the members. In 
essence, it is situation whereby a single monetary policy prevails and inside which a single 
currency or currencies are perfect substitutes. Our interviews with stakeholders revealed that, 
although some progress has been made, there still exist practical legal and institutional 
challenges and impediments that would require a much longer time to resolve. It is not feasible, 
therefore, to achieve a monetary union by 2009. 
17. A political federation entails a given division of responsibility between the components or tiers 
of government. Its precise nature is a matter of constitutional design resulting from negotiation 
between stakeholders. The very design of a federation may be critical for its survival, 
particularly how it addresses the distribution of cost and benefits in the short and long run. 
18. All stakeholders acknowledged the lack of popular ownership of the process towards a polit ical 
federation. Second, in the immediate future the forthcoming elections in Tanzania and Uganda 
are likely to slow down the regional process because the political systems of the partner 
countries remain orientated towards domestic constituencies and issues. Third, the view is often 
voiced that all partner countries have – to varying degrees – democratic deficits or internal 
security problems. The recent decision to adopt a multi-party system in Uganda is offset against 
the constitutional amendment to allow the incumbent president to stand for yet another term. 
The ongoing constitutional wrangling in Kenya is a source of concern. In Tanzania, the 
Zanzibar issue continues to mar the political struggle. Northern Uganda is still a war zone and 
ethnic skirmishes have erupted in Karamoja and Marsabit. Against this backdrop, most 
respondents see the establishment of a political superstructure in the form of a federation as 
premature. Rather, each partner country is called upon to bring its own house in order before 
creating a superstructure which would be resting on a shaky foundation. 
19. Our interviews revealed with great clarity that hardly anybody saw the 1 January 2010 target 
date for a political federation as a feasible proposition. At one extreme a respondent indicated 
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2050 as a more likely date, others considered 2025 as a reasonable time frame, and some just 
added five or ten years to the fast-track committee’s target date. 
20. Almost without exception the interviewees subscribed to the gradual building block approach 
and favoured starting with measures that would build legitimacy from below by removing 
existing impediments to regional interaction and thus improving the lives of the citizens of East 
Africa. In their view, only then would the integration project gain the necessary credibility. 
They saw the demonstration of tangible benefits for various constituencies as the litmus test of 
success, not a political superstructure remote from the grassroots. 
21. The EAC secretariat is small but effective, although at times it gets bogged down in meetings 
and administrative tasks that divert attention from priority tasks. Capacity is overstretched, 
dangerously close to overloading. It is clear that whatever its staff complement, the secretariat 
must be fundable by the partner states. 
22. The newest development in the interface between the EAC and the donor community is the 
planned EAC Development Fund. The basic idea is to pool resources provided by the EAC 
partner states and the development partners in order to finance programmes and projects. On a 
smaller scale a consultancy fund existed previously. The intention now is to increase the 
volume of the fund and broaden it scope. Apart from increasing the pool of resources available 
for developing the EAC, the Fund is also intended to forestall the inconsistencies, overlaps, and 
even incompatibilities, of projects and programmes with the EAC’s overall agenda. As such the 
proposed Fund could become a much needed vehicle for better co-ordination of donor support 
and better alignment with the priorities established by the EAC, which would entail enhanced 
dialogue between the two parties. There is little doubt that the administrative transaction costs 
could also be brought down through this mechanism. 
23. Draft rules and regulations have been worked out for the Fund. They provide for a committee to 
oversee the management of the Fund, consisting of one representative of the EAC appointed by 
the Secretary-General; one representative of each of the EAC partner states; and one 
representative from each development partner who has contributed to the Fund. The committee 
is to take decisions by consensus. Contributions are to be made as grants. The draft regulations 
also provide for rules governing procurement, accounting and auditing, which would serve to 
allay most donor concerns about possible misuse. The Fund is an excellent initiative and we 
recommend donors to make contributions for its capitalisation. However, the danger of donor 
dependency must be addressed. 
24. Donor support is not only about the provision of money. Equally important is institutional 
development to enable the EAC to handle the increasing inflow of funds in a planned, 
transparent and accountable manner. As the process of integration evolves the commensurate 
institutional needs will continue to grow. 
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1. Introduction 
The peoples of East Africa have since time immemor ial interacted in various ways – through inter-
marriage, trade, etc. Existing borders were drawn by the former colonial powers in total disregard of 
the settlement patterns of the day. But these borders have continued to be porous to this day. Indeed, 
some population groups are oblivious of the existence of such boundaries. 
  
Formal East African co-operation dates as far back as the end of the 19th century when construction 
commenced on the ‘Uganda Railway’ from the coastal town of Mombasa to its completion in 1901 
when it reached Kisumu on the shores of Lake Victoria. Through the years the spheres of co-
operation were expanded to include customs arrangements, culminating in the formation of the East 
African High Commission in 1948, which lasted until the independence of Tanzania in 1961. At 
that point in time the High Commission was superseded by the East African Common Services 
Organisation and the East African Community (EAC) in 1967. Ten years thereafter the EAC 
collapsed. After much bickering over the assets and liabilities, a Mediation Agreement was arrived 
at in 1984.1 
 
The collapse of the Community in 1977 is widely attributed to three main factors: (a) the 
inequitable distribution of costs and benefits among the partner states; (b) the ideological 
differences between the partner states; and (c) the personality clashes between the heads of state of 
the partner countries after Idi Amin’s 1971 military coup in Uganda. 
 
The Philip Commission that set the stage for the formation of the EAC in 1967 was cognisant of the 
equity issue. Great care was taken to allocate the Community’s common services institutions so as 
to redress existing disparities. Thus, Kenya hosted the headquarters of the East African Railways 
and the East African Airways, while Tanzania was allocated the Harbours Corporation and the 
headquarters of the Community itself in Arusha. The East African Development Bank and the East 
African Post and Telecommunications Corporation were located in Uganda. Furthermore, the 1967 
Treaty provided for a transfer tax system designed to protect industries in Tanzania and Uganda 
against their Kenyan competitors. 
 
The three partner states appeared to part ideological ways in the late 1960s. In 1967 Tanzania 
adopted the Arusha Declaration, which ushered in a socialist era, emphasising self-reliance and 
eschewing foreign investment. Much in the same vein, under President Milton Obote, Uganda opted 
for the Common Man’s Charter, which, in effect, established an ideological axis between Tanzania 
and Uganda. Kenya, on the other hand, had laid down its ideological precepts in Sessional Paper 
No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya, which, despite the 
term socialism, set the stage for an open, liberal economy welcoming foreign investment. The 
sceptical view of foreign investment taken by Tanzania and Uganda caused potential investors in 
the region to cast their eyes on Kenya. The relatively better infrastructure and industrial base in 
Kenya, inherited from colonial times, also favoured an inflow of investment. Thus, old disparities 
and new ideological dispositions combined to reinforce inequalities. 
 
The ideological axis between Tanzania and Uganda was broken when Idi Amin deposed Milton 
Obote in the January 1971 military coup. President Nyerere of Tanzania refused to sit at the same 
                                                 
1 For a good overview of developments after 1961 see Korwa G. Adar and Mutahi Ngunyi, ‘The Politics of 
Integration in East Africa Since Independence’, in Walter O. Oyugi (ed.), Politics and Administration in East 
Africa, Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1992. 
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table as Idi Amin, whom he regarded as a ‘treacherous army leader’. From then onwards the EAC 
Authority, consisting of the three heads of state, never met. This was disastrous for the Community, 
whose Authority was to take decisions by consensus, and eventually led to its collapse. 
 
Following a seven-year hiatus after the Community’s collapse in 1977, moves were made to revive 
the erstwhile co-operative venture, leading at first to the Nairobi Communiqué of 1991, and two 
years later, to an agreement re-establishing the EAC Secretariat in 1996. These events were all 
precursors to the resuscitation of East African co-operation in a new guise and with a new vision 
when in November 1999 a Treaty formally re-launched the East African Community. With its 
subsequent ratification by the three partner states the Treaty entered into force in July 2000. 
 
The long history of collaboration between the three East African states with its ups and downs has 
left a legacy – for good and bad. This legacy has a bearing on the contemporary dynamics of 
collaboration in several respects. The processes and experiences leading up to the collapse of the 
Community in 1977 still linger in the minds of politicians and civil servants. On the negative side a 
certain amount of scepticism remains on the part of Tanzania and Uganda vis-à-vis Kenya on 
account of the widespread perception that Kenya benefited disproportionately from regional co-
operation at the expense of the other partners. It does not matter much whether these perceptions 
reflect reality or whether they are a figment of the imagination of the individuals holding them. 
Perceptions take on a reality of their own, on the basis of which people continue to think and act. To 
the extent that the perceptions are unfounded they need to be dispelled through new experiences. 
 
To a much lesser extent the previous ideological differences between ‘socialist’ Tanzania and 
Uganda and ‘capitalist’ Kenya also remain a reality. At the same time, the ‘statist’ mode of thinking 
is still pervasive in much of the civil service of the partner countries, particularly in those of 
Tanzania and Uganda, but also in Kenya’s to some degree. There is reason to believe, however, that 
with the newfound common platform in a liberal conception of the state and a market-driven 
economy, the old mindset is bound to wane and eventually disappear. It would be a mistake, 
however, to presume that bygones are bygones. 
 
Although there is no denying that a historical legacy exists, the current situation is fundamentally 
different from that obtaining nearly 30 years ago. The thrust of the new Treaty assumes an entirely 
different orientation, largely reflecting the changing trends of political and economic reform in the 
past two decades. Governance issues have moved higher up on the agenda, with new emphases on 
democratisation, broader participation and human rights observance. In the economic sphere the 
role of the state has been reduced and changed in nature. The state is currently seen rather as a 
facilitator through the creation of an enabling environment conducive to economic growth, e.g. by 
harmonising policies and building infrastructure. The private sector, on the other hand, is given a 
greater role in production and distribution without undue interference by the state. The era of the 
‘interventionist’ state is over. 
 
The pertinent question is often being asked whether the new EAC stands a better chance of success 
than its predecessor. After all, it is claimed with a cynical slant, most of the problems remain the 
same and many of the personalities involved have only been recycled. It is asserted, furthermore, 
that the ‘statist’ or ‘interventionist’ mode of thinking is so ingrained in at least some of the civil 
services of the partner countries that the ostensible policy reorientation is merely superficial. 
Moreover, the old discord re-emerges in new guises. On this basis the prediction is made by some 
observers that the integration process is likely to be slower than expected and that fast-tracking is 
not feasible. The extreme pessimists and cynics claim that ten years down the line the EAC will 
either have ground to a halt or collapsed yet again.
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How can these pessimistic arguments be countered and the factors underpinning them be 
obliterated? First, whereas there may be some merit to the argument that many regional problems 
remain the same as before, a closer examination reveals that the international environment has 
changed dramatically. Globalisation has left an imprint on the economies of the collaborating states, 
both in terms of challenges and opportunities. Above all, there is a growing realisation that these 
challenges must be met and the opportunities exploited. This can be done more effectively on a 
regional footing, which would add weight in international fora and markets. 
 
Second, some old leaders are admittedly still at the helm but it is closer to the truth that a change of 
leadership generation has occurred. This observation applies to politicians as well as civil servants. 
Notwithstanding the ‘recycling’ of some politicians and civil servants, the sheer demography of 
East Africa has produced a new generation of actors at all levels and in all spheres of society. This 
augurs well for movement ahead. All current heads of state assumed office after the collapse of the 
old EAC in 1977, even though they no doubt carry those painful experiences with them. As a result, 
when stepping down they have a particular interest in leaving a different legacy by turning the new 
EAC into their success story. Couched in negative terms, they have a strong incentive to prevent the 
failure of the EAC a second time around; that would be too severe a loss of face. 
 
Third, while it might be true that old contradictions are extant, there is reason to believe that some 
lessons have been learned from history. The gradual treaty-making process, involving consultation 
with a wide array of stakeholders, attests to that. Whenever views have diverged ample time has 
been allowed for their resolution, rather than glossing over them or sweeping them under the carpet. 
This approach has caused some delay but it has been considered prudent to proceed in this manner 
rather than force through quasi-solutions that would only prove untenable later. 
 
Fourth, in the mid-1960s when the old EAC Treaty was negotiated the approach was far from 
participatory. The old EAC was predominantly an inter-governmental affair of the three partner 
states, generally excluding the private sector and civil society. By contrast, the process leading up to 
the adoption of the Treaty involved all major stakeholders deliberating on a widely circulated draft 
treaty document. It should be recalled that the private sector has been a principal driving force 
behind the resurrection of the EAC because the confines of the nation-states are found to constrain 
the markets. 
 
Fifth, although remnants of ‘statist’ thinking linger, the political and economic reform processes 
that have evolved since the 1980s have dispelled much of the previous faith in the omnipotent 
capabilities of the state. Drawing on the substance of these reforms, the private sector is no longer 
as subdued as it once was. Similarly, civil society organisations have become vocal in criticising 
government policies and are asserting themselves in public affairs. The state will simply not be 
allowed to take the driver’s seat like it used to do. These developments are encouraging for the new 
dynamism of a regional venture like the EAC.  
 
As a precursor to the new EAC the East African Co-operation had been in operation for several 
years. This gradual approach suggested caution and recognition of the need for adequate time in 
deliberating on thorny issues among the stakeholders. The evaluation commissioned to assess the 
results of the 1997-2000 period was quite clear in its findings.2 It concluded on a positive note that 
the implementation of the work programme had been quite successful, commendable, and 
encouraging, laying a good foundation for the signing and ratification of a full treaty. The bottom 
line was that the opportunity cost of non-integration was high. 
                                                 
2 See Economic and Social Research Foundation, CODA Consulting Group and Economic Policy Research 
Centre, Final Draft of the Evaluation Report of the Implementation of the East African Co-operation 
Development Strategy 1997–2000, 14 November 2000, mimeo. 
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The Treaty creates a region of 93 million people with a combined GNP of more than US$ 30 
billion. Aggregate industrial output is double that of Zimbabwe but only 8 per cent of South 
Africa’s. Although a comparatively small free trade area East Africa has considerable potential for 
growth. The signing of the Treaty signalled a renewed political commitment to regional integration. 
 
Five years on, the regional integration project has progressed considerably. The major achievement 
is the conclusion – after protracted negotiations lasting four years – of a customs union protocol 
which entered into force at the beginning of 2005. In other fields the rate of progress has also been 
impressive, albeit variable. 
 
Notwithstanding notable progress in a range of fields, the Heads of State of the three partner 
countries have been impatient and expressed concern that the rate of progress was too slow. 
Consequently, they appointed a committee to look into the possibility of fast-tracking the 
integration process. Its terms of reference were to examine ways and means “to expedite and 
compress the process of integration so that the ultimate goal of a Political Federation is achieved 
through a fast track mechanism.” The committee set about its task on 21 September 2004 and 
submitted its report by the tough deadline of 26 November 2004.  
 
The authors of the present consultancy report have been asked to assess the realism and feasibility 
of the recommendations and time schedule suggested by the fast-track committee (see appendix 5: 
Terms of reference). In doing so, we have perused a large number of documents, academic writings 
and newspaper reports. Above all, we have interviewed altogether 63 respondents in the three 
partner states, representing a wide range of stakeholders from the civil service, the private sector, 
the academic world, and civil society (see appendix 4: Persons consulted). Interviews have also 
been conducted with staff of the EAC secretariat in Arusha. Our analysis, findings and 
recommendations are based on the above information sources. 
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2. Approaches to regional integration 
A considerable literature has accumulated on the subject of regional integration, federalism, federal 
political systems and federations.3 From this body of literature there emerge two contrasting 
approaches to regional integration. One is associated with the late president of Ghana, Kwame 
Nkrumah, who is famous for his pan-Africanist dictum: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and 
everything else shall be delivered onto you.”4 The underlying thinking was that paramount political 
institutions would be used as vehicles for bringing about integration in other spheres. Nkrumah saw 
a loose confederation of economic co-operation as deceptively time-delaying. His top-down 
approach reflected impatience to forge ahead with haste and banked on political pushes doing the 
trick. 
 
At the other extreme is the functionalist approach whereby regional integration is promoted 
piecemeal through gradual steps to painstakingly building a web of functional relations in trade, 
investment, infrastructure, culture, etc. In this building-block approach the political superstructure, 
such as a political federation, would be considered the logical culmination of the integration process 
from below. Both of these differing strands of thinking appear to be alive in East Africa today, 
although the faith in building blocks takes the upper hand by far, if judged by the responses of our 
interviewees. 
 
Paradoxically, Africa is at the same time experiencing contradictory pressures – on the one hand, 
for economic and political integration towards larger regional entities and federations with supra-
national systems of governance, and, on the other hand, towards disintegration of existing state 
formations resulting from secessionist movements based on ethnicity or other sources of social 
identity. These contradictory processes are very much present in East Africa too. We shall return to 
them in the section on the political federation below. 
 
It is not intuitively evident what a federation is. Therefore, we would like to suggest a definition 
which is broad enough to be applicable in the East African context. “A federation is a compound 
polity combining constituent units [currently Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in the case of East 
Africa, and later possibly also including Rwanda and Burundi] and a general government, each 
possessing powers delegated to it by its people through a constitution, each empowered to deal 
directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant portion of its legislative, administrative, and 
taxing powers, and each directly elected by its citizens.”5 The design of federations can take a 
variety of forms, depending on the size and nature of the constituent parts. The original design is 
often a determining factor of success or failure. Hence, great care must be put into the design effort 
to achieve success. 
 
In designing federations the challenge of asymmetry between the constituent units is a recurring 
phenomenon. In the case of East Africa the colonial borders introduced cleavages which 
subsequently evolved into economic structures that currently appear to be difficult hurdles to 
overcome. Similarly, cultural differences between countries and within countries may also be seen 
as cleavages that impede progress towards integration. Nevertheless, it remains true that the 
commonalities between the East African partner states outweigh the differences and cleavages. It is 
                                                 
3 For an overview, see Ronald L. Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations’, in Annual 
Review of Political Science, 1998, pp. 117–137. 
4 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London: Heinemann, 1963. 
5 Ronald L. Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations’, in Annual Review of Political 
Science, 1998, p. 121. 
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on the basis of that acknowledgement that further integration can be built. It should be noted, 
however, that the EAC is not unique in terms of asymmetries. It is rather a common feature of most 
regional organisations, both in Africa and elsewhere. African cases in point include SADC and 
ECOWAS.  
 
Whatever the differences and similarities, however, federal arrangements are meant precisely to 
provide compromise solutions that can accommodate difference, while at the same time facilitate 
interaction and deeper integration. Various instruments may be designed to redress asymmetries and 
promote cohesion, e.g. structural funds and tax transfers. Even so, it must be recognised that federal 
arrangements are no panacea. For example, at independence the Nigerian federation comprised 
three constituent states. After the devastating Biafra war in the mid- and late-1960s when the Igbo-
dominated part of the federation unsuccessfully tried to secede, the fragmentation of Nigeria has 
continued unabatedly to the point that it now consists of nearly 40 states. Nonetheless, these 
attempts to accommodate sub-federal political ambitions have not contributed much to stability. 
 
One major reason why federal arrangements fail to produce stability and prosperity can be found in 
the distribution of costs and benefits among the constituent units. Sovereign territorial states enter 
into co-operative arrangements and, as a matter of course, they have expectations of gain. Over time 
these expectations must be fulfilled, at least in part. Although short-term losses are weighed against 
long-term benefits, the net long-term benefits must be positive. Otherwise a co-operative venture 
would surely die or soon become moribund. Moreover, it is often not enough for all partners to reap 
net benefits in the long run. After all, it is a rare occurrence that partners incur net losses over time; 
if so, the design of the co-operative would be flawed at the outset. Any partner would monitor 
whether the other partners benefit more, even if all of them benefit some. A systematically skewed 
distribution of costs and benefits over time represents the greatest threat to regional co-
operation/integration. If regional disparities are allowed to persist – or worse, to widen – the weaker 
partners are likely to see such arrangements as a raw deal even if their net benefits are positive. 
Correspondingly, the stronger partners may feel that they are carrying a disproportional burden, for 
example by subsidising the weaker ones. Thus, weaker and stronger partners might want to opt out, 
but for differing reasons. Either way, the collaborative venture might collapse.    
 
If the issue of distribution of costs and benefits is not addressed in a manner that is considered 
legit imate and fair by all parties concerned, the likelihood of a breakdown is high. Even perceptions 
at variance with reality must be taken into account, because people think and act on the basis of 
perceptions whether they are based on facts or not. There is no escaping the fact that asymmetries 
do exist between the East African partner states, and from them stem challenges related to the 
distribution of cost and benefits. Most analysts and observers are agreed that the failure to deal 
adequately with these issues was the main reason (along with others, of course) why the erstwhile 
EAC collapsed in 1977. Lest the same happen yet again, it is imperative that mechanisms of 
redistribution be integral parts of the design of all integration measures. The fact that the principle 
of asymmetry has already been built into the customs union protocol is indicative of a capability for 
learning from history, which augurs well for the design of other initiatives. 
 
Apart from addressing the vexing question of distribution of costs and benefits among partners, it is 
also challenging to allocate tasks and responsibilities in a federal set-up. In Europe, the principle of 
subsidiarity  has been propounded. Although difficult to operationalise, it simply means that 
responsibilities should be assigned to the lowest tier of a federal structure that can adequately 
perform them. The underlying rationale is avoidance of top-heavy bureaucracies overburdened with 
multiple tasks that can be more efficiently and more responsively geared towards the needs of the 
citizens if handled at lower tiers of government. All three East African partners are currently 
evolving policies of devolution or implementing such policies. They differ in design and operation. 
Whatever their nature and multiple tiers, the existing structures of local government and sub-
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national governance could probably be retained within an East African federation. The real 
challenge is to allocate responsibilities between the envisaged federal level and those best 
performed at the national level and down the hierarchy. This is the design task assigned to the 
drafters of a constitution for the contemplated political federation. Experiences elsewhere suggest 
that whatever constitution is adopted eventually, struggles over administrative competence between 
levels are likely to persist. For example, ever since the American constitution was adopted in the 
18th century legal and political bickering between state and federal levels has permeated American 
politics. In the East African context – once the constitution of an East African federation is crafted 
and eventually adopted – the East African Court of Justice would presumably be given powers to 
adjudicate in matters regarding the respective jurisdictions of the national and federal levels. 
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3. Fast-tracking the East African integration process 
Despite notable progress since the resuscitation of East African co-operation and the signing of the 
Treaty in 1999, the Heads of State of the three partner countries nevertheless felt at the Nairobi 
Summit in August 2004 that the rate of progress was too slow. As a result, they found it expedient 
to appoint a committee to consider ways and means “to expedite and compress the process of 
integration so that the ultimate goal of a Political Federation is achieved through a fast track 
mechanism.” The committee submitted a comprehensive report on 26 November 2004. 
 
This section will highlight the findings and recommendations of the fast-tracking committee and 
provide the gist of its deliberations. 
 
The committee considered three fast-tracking options: 
1. Compression of the current stages of integration: (a) customs union; (b) common market; (c) 
monetary union; and (d) political federation; 
2. Overlapping and parallel processes of integration; 
3. Immediate establishment of an East African federation. 
 
When deliberating over these options the committee reviewed a number of relevant issues – 
including past experiences – considered pros and cons, risks and hurdles. It pointed out that a sound 
foundation is needed for a political federation to be sustainable, including a solid economic base 
and support by the populations of East Africa. With regard to the latter, the committee 
recommended that a referendum be held in order to sensitise the people about the benefits and 
merits of a federation and to allow the popular view to be expressed. 
 
On the basis of thorough deliberation of the issues mentioned above, the committee recommended 
the second middle-of-the-road option: overlapping and parallel processes of integration. It discarded 
the compression of the stages of integration and shied away from immediately establishing the 
‘political kingdom’ in the form of a political federation. The preferred second option implied 
leaving the implementation schedule for the customs union unchanged, i.e. five years from the 
beginning of 2005 through 2009. It also entailed a “consolidated and planned approach in the form 
of negotiating templates” in order to fast-track the process towards a political federation. The 
committee acknowledged that the success of this approach would partly depend on the design and 
implementation of the strategic interventions envisaged and partly on the involvement of a wide 
range of stakeholders such as the private sector, professional associations, civil society and the 
people at large. 
 
The strategic interventions were envisaged in three phases. The first preparatory phase would 
address the institutional framework and financial inputs required to move to the next phase. The 
second transitional phase (2006-2009) would comprise the implementation of the customs union, 
the common market and the monetary union – the substance of economic integration. A measure of 
success in these substantive elements in the economic sphere was in turn regarded as the foundation 
of a political federation. Other substantive components include progress in infrastructure, science 
and technology, constitutional and financial issues. The launching date for the political federation 
was set at 1 January 2010, at which time a federal president is expected to be sworn in. The third 
consolidation phase (2010-2013) will complete the process towards federating East Africa by 
establishing an electoral system for the election of a federal government. The guiding principle 
underlying all phases is that the establishment of a political federation should not have to await the 
falling into place of all the pieces in the integration puzzle. Rather, the fast-track committee seems 
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to subscribe to the notion that not all integrative measures are pre-requisites for a political 
federation to be established. Only essential elements will have to be put in place. Remaining 
programmes would continue to be implemented even after the establishment of a federation, thus 
further consolidating its foundation. 
 
The committee was cognizant of the financial implications of its recommendations and time 
schedule. It proposed, therefore, that an estimated 1 per cent of customs revenue or 0.25 per cent of 
the value of all imports into the partner states be channelled into a pool for the financing of 
activities during the transition. 
 
The committee’s voluminous report (378 pages including appendices) first considered East African 
integration in historical context and summarised developments since the signing of the Treaty in 
1999. A sectoral review highlighted both achievements and challenges in a remarkably frank and 
self-critical fashion. For example, the committee noted and lamented: the lack of a politically 
accountable authority at the regional level; the lack of clearly defined roles for the East African 
Legislative Assembly and the East African Court of Justice in contributing to the integration 
endeavour; the practice that EAC secretariat staff prepare EAC budgets on the basis of ministerial 
ceilings in national budgets; the tardiness of some partner states in remitting their contributions; the 
unduly complex and time-consuming procurement procedures; the lack of sanctions mechanism 
when commitments are not honoured, implementation is slow due resistance by high-level 
bureaucrats, when partners states backtrack on decisions taken, etc.  
 
It also deplored the practice that the EAC secretariat had become a forum where technocrats from 
partner states negotiate to advance national positions instead of adjusting those positions to regional 
requirements and standards. Such practices are time-consuming and wasteful, and hardly in the 
spirit of regional co-operation. Moreover, the committee regretted that the respective ministers in 
charge of community and regional affairs are predominantly ministers of foreign affairs whose 
mandates divert attention from regional matters. Finally, it also cited as a source of concern that 
currently donors contribute 27 per cent of the EAC secretariat’s budget. Given that the secretariat is 
overstretched and poised to expand in the future to be able to handle an increasing number of tasks, 
it is mandatory that better financing arrangements be instituted to avoid even greater donor 
dependency. This refreshing self-critique served as a point of departure for the committee’s 
recommendations. 
 
Before arriving at the above-mentions option of overlapping and parallel processes of integration, 
the committee examined the pros and cons of each option. With regard to the third option of 
federating immediately, the point was made that a political federation might serve to avoid or 
minimise divided loyalties between national and regional interests. However, greater emphasis was 
put on three other factors militating against a hurried federation. First, the historical legacy of the 
defunct East African Community of yesteryear lingers in the minds of politicians and civil servants, 
indeed in the consciousness of ordinary folks. Second, attempts elsewhere to federate through 
declarations by political leaders have failed, e.g. in the Sene-Gambia, Egypt and Libya, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh. Third, even though the idea of an East African federation has been around for 
more than four decades, the partner countries have been more preoccupied with consolidating their 
internal structures and processes than with creating larger political arrangements. Many would 
argue that they are all still trying to grapple with internal challenges of that nature at the expense of 
regional concerns. 
 
In the course of its work, the committee solicited views and perceptions from stakeholders 
throughout the region. From consultations emerges a clear picture of an East African people 
overwhelmingly in favour of a federation. However, they were united in their call for a people -
centred federation based on a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down declaration by the 
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political elites of the three partner countries. Expectations of tangible benefits affecting their daily 
lives also emerged as central themes. Notwithstanding enthusiasm and expectations, certain 
apprehensions and concerns were also noted. Most of these concerns centred on imbalances and 
disparities between the partner states, often with reference to historical experience. Hence, it was 
felt that modalities should be put in place to ensure equity. 
 
The evolution of a common market with free movement of all factors of production including 
labour and the right of establishment anywhere within the borders of the community produced fears 
of unemployment or displacement of labour; loss of protection and market shares; loss of land; and 
adverse social and cultural impacts. 
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4. The customs union and the common market  
The treaty for the establishment of the East African Community was signed in 1999 and entered 
into effect in 2000. It envisaged the establishment of a single market and investment area in the 
region and the harmonisation of policies to promote cross-border trade and investment, ease cross-
border movements of goods and persons, development of infrastructure, and enhancement of 
technological and human resource development. 
 
Prior to the signing of the Treaty a number of achievements were realised in accordance with the 
1997-2000 development strategy. They include: 
 
1 Confidence-building by setting up a defence liaison office at the EAC secretaria t, and the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Foreign Policy Co-ordination; 
2 Harmonisation of policies, such as convertibility of currencies, reading of budget statements on 
the same day and time, implementation of preferential tariff discount, harmonisation of 
standards of goods and services, mutual recognition of health certificates issued by national 
bodies for goods traded in East Africa; 
3 Easing of cross-border movement of persons and goods through an East African passport, 
allowing a seven-day grace period for personal motor vehicles, establishing immigration desks 
for East Africans at international airports, re-introducing interstate passes and withdrawing of 
visa charges for students; 
4 Infrastructure development by implementing projects in telecommunications, roads, civil 
aviation, posts, meteorology, energy, and other related areas.   
 
A second development strategy covering the period 2001-2005 was prepared, focusing mainly on 
the establishment of a customs union and later on a common market and the enhancement of 
cooperation for mutual benefit of partner states. The most significant milestone of the second 
development strategy is the establishment of the East African Community Customs Union.   
The customs union 
The three partner countries ratif ied the customs union protocol on 30 November, 2004 which is to 
be implemented over a five-year term. They also agreed to resolve the problem of multiple 
memberships in regional blocs and to remove non-tariff barriers. A timeline was fixed for the 
implementation of the protocol, as depicted in Figure 1 below. 
  
Figure 1: Timeline for the implementation of the customs union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratification by November 
2004 
Early customs union by 
January 2005 
Harmonisation of tax 
policies by July 2005 
Transit cargo vehicles by 
July 2005 
Opening of East Africa 
border points (on 
identification) 
Early customs 
service by July 2007 
Elimination of non-tariff 
barriers (continues) 
Elimination of inter-state border 
controls by January 2010 
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The signing of the protocol for the establishment of the EAC customs union was the most 
significant starting point for the practical phase of the Community. Its implementation started in 
January 2005. The objectives spelled out in the protocol include the liberalisation of the intra-
regional trade regime on the basis mutual benefits, promotion of efficiency in production within the 
Community, and the promotion of economic development and industrial diversification. The 
protocol provides for the establishment of a common external tariff (CET), trade remedies and the 
prevention, investigation and suppression of custom offences, and collection of customs duty by 
adopting a uniform standard of valuation of goods. 
 
During the initial implementation period of the custom union, several problems have been 
encountered. The principal ones are: 
 
(i)  While internal tariffs have been largely eliminated in line with the protocol, non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) such as customs, immigration, administrative procedures and regulations and 
licenses, have not been fully eliminated and they continue to increase the cost of doing 
business in the region and have negatively impacted on trade and co-operation; 
(ii)  The customs union protocol does not encompass the private sector in the process of 
implementation and private/public sector partnerships have not been enhanced;  
(iii)  The issue of dynamic gains/losses from trade liberalisation has not been clear since the 
inception of the customs union;  
(iv)  The customs union protocol does not incorporate the impact of imperfect competition which 
can increase gains in some countries at the expense of the others;  
(v) Key issues such as protection of manufacturing sectors, disharmony in tax subsidies and 
unstable macro-economic environments remain unresolved;  
(vi)  The exemption regime under the East Africa Community Customs Management Act 2004 
seems to have created controversy relating to CET structure on grains such as wheat, barley, 
non- governmental organisations, agricultural and horticultural inputs; 
(vii)  The CET structure is not consistent with the tax structures in the individual partner countries, 
and 
(viii)  The issue of membership in multiple regional trading blocs has yet to be resolved. This 
configuration is potentially disruptive because it overburdens the civil services and creates 
contradictory situations that are untenable in the long run.   
 
As long as these problems remain unresolved, it is difficult to strictly adhere to the implementation 
time-scale outlined in Figure 1. 
The East African common market 
Article 5(2) of the EAC Treaty provides that after the customs union, partner states will progress to 
a common market. The smooth functioning of a common market entails improved macro-economic 
policy synchronisation and co-ordination, especially the fiscal regimes. Furthermore, the Article 
suggests that a pre-requisite for achieving common market status is the easing of border-crossing by 
citizens of the partner states and the harmonisation and maintenance of uniform employment/labour 
policies, programmes and legislation. So far, achievements made towards a common market 
protocol include: 
 
(i)  Easing the movement of people through the introduction of the East African passport, adoption 
of a single immigration entry, special passes for border communities, progress in developing a 
protocol on the free movement of persons, labour, services and the right of establishment and 
residence, and harmonisation of labour policies and legislation, and  
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(ii)  Harmonisation of economic policies through liberalisation of the exchange rate and interest 
rates, similar investment incentives, endeavours to harmonise fiscal policy, and joint capital 
markets development policy. 
 
However, there are great disparities in the trading patterns of the three countries as shown in 
Appendix 3. This realisation poses potential challenges to the integration process. 
 
The fast-track report highlighted that there were delayed negotiations on the protocol on free 
movement of persons in the treaty and the development strategies, the structure of legal and 
administrative of partners varied considerably, and there is currently no framework that can 
facilitate labour migration or movement of persons, goods, and services. It recognised such 
problems and challenges as expressions of nationalistic chauvinism of losing “what is ours”, 
unequal development of human resources, non-recognition of different development of human 
resources, lack of harmonised labour regimes, and the need to undertake an impact analysis of the 
common market protocol on the economies of East Africa. In view of these challenges, the report 
gave the timeline of implementation of common market activities as shown below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Timeline for the implementation of a common market 
Activity Time of completion 
Temporary permits to be ready within three months March 2005 
Task force to design the East African passport March 2005 
Internationalise the East African passport December 2008 
Issuance of East African ID by Uganda and Tanzania  December 2006 
Formation of task force on free movement of persons, labour, services, 
goods and the right of establishment and residence  
January 2005 
Initiate negotiations of free movement of persons, labour, services, 
goods and the right of establishment and residence 
January 2005 
Initiate negotiations on the common market January 2005 
Conclude protocol on the free movement of persons December 2006 
Conclude negotiations on the common market protocol December 2007 
Harmonisation of entry/work permits and amendments common laws July 2005 
Harmonisation of commercial laws, etc.  December 2007 
Allow personal vehicles a 90-day stay in partner states January 2005 
Allow return cargo by transporters January 2005 
 
 
It is noted that the fast-track report does not adequately address the issue of labour mobility which is 
critical in achieving common market status and crucial in determining the long-term success or 
failure of the EAC. The varying levels of labour productivity and unemployment rates raises 
fundamental issues. Because differences in productivity will not disappear overnight, however, 
adopting uniform standards may lead to rising unemployment in low-productivity countries which 
will go against the initial impetus of spearheading integration. Thus, developing acceptable 
protocols for this requirement is likely to pose the most serious challenge to the entire process of 
integration. 
 
Overall, the main challenge to achieving the common market goal is that the three countries differ 
in their structure, economic development and institutional setting. Each country has pronounced its 
own reforms without due consideration to their impact of the other states. This challenge is 
reminiscent of the conclusion of Philip Ndegwa that the benefits accruing from the original 
common market formed in the 1960s was not equally shared. He argued that: 
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The best way to achieve full integration is to proceed on a sectoral basis.  Countries 
intending to form a Co mmon Market should start by having a Common Market in one 
industry, and so on until a full market is formed. This approach is advocated on the grounds 
that the system is flexible and that it is easier to reach agreement in negotiations. This 
approach has much to support it where there are large national differences and where 
countries have wide range of industries, which could benefit from abolition of tariffs.6 
  
It is therefore prudent to conclude that given the dynamics and the complexity of achieving a 
common market, the 2007 deadline is over-ambitious.  
Stakeholders’ views 
Interviews with a reasonable sample of stakeholders revealed that the majority of them had not read 
the report. However, they were privy to the subject and were able to give intelligent analyses of the 
proposals contained therein. Below is a summary discussion of their positions and/or perceptions. 
Civil servants and technocrats 
This group felt strongly that the creation of a custom union and a common market are noble goals. 
However, they find the time-scale given to achieve them unrealistic because there are many 
outstanding issues that need thorough analysis, discussion and negotiation. The issues centre around 
the short-term distribution of integration benefits and concomitant costs; the need to cushion against 
implementation shocks arising from existing country-specific tax laws and commitments; the fear 
that the process is highly politically motivated and lacks both the pre-requisite technical inputs and 
without being people-focused; and the prioritisation and sequencing of the various building blocks. 
They take the view that the time frame is not the most important thing and that the cornerstone of 
successful integration is careful sequencing of dealing with issues of macro-economic  convergence, 
harmonisation of revenue collection and security and concentration on regional projects in the areas 
of infrastructure, energy and human resource development. For this group of respondents, it is 
evident that they fear the unknown, have a status-quo syndrome, are slow and conservative, are 
hanging on with the memories/problems of the previous community and suffer from bureaucratic 
inertia. Hence, they would wish to take a more cautious approach and hope that, perhaps, 10 to 15 
years are needed before the full realisation of a common market. 
Business community 
This group is generally positive and is pushing to reap short-term interest and benefits. 
Businesspeople are supportive of integration not because they have long-term business horizons but 
rather because they are worried about what they are likely to lose immediately.  The Kenyan 
business community, especially manufacturers, want total and quick liberalisation because they are 
advantaged and more competitive than their counterparts in Tanzania and Uganda. On the other 
hand, the business communities in Tanzania and Uganda do not think that the time scale for the 
establishment of the customs union and the common market are realistic. They feel that Kenyans 
would exploit the situation and dominate the market from a position of strength. 
EAC secretariat staff  
This is the most progressive group. They appreciate the inadequacy of the institutional framework 
for implementing the customs union and common market protocols.  They know that there are many 
                                                 
6 Philip Ndegwa, The Common Market and Development in East Africa, Nairobi: East African Publishing 
House, 1968. 
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unresolved and unforeseeable issues that militate against the speedy implementation of the various 
protocols. In addition, they identify the key obstacles to the speedy implementation of the various 
protocols and the crafting of the remaining protocols as including conflicts between various 
institutions responsible for community affairs and parent national ministries; a multiplicity of 
country-specific organisational and technical drawbacks; lack of a central authority to ensure quick 
decisions and timely implementation of the same; and the existence of national technocrats who are 
die-hard “nationalists”. They would wish to push for deeper integration in the areas of legal and 
constitutional framework, an enhanced role for the private sector, mechanisms for rapid resolution 
of trade issues, co-ordinated infrastructural development, a common foreign policy and clear rules 
on the admission of new members. The secretariat respondents concur with the view that, 
notwithstanding their total support for the integration process, the time-line proposed is not feasible 
and should be extended by at least 10 years. 
Diplomats and donors 
There is overwhelming agreement among the diplomats and donors who were interviewed in 
Nairobi, Kampala and Dar es Salaam that the integration time-line is not feasible and that more 
background work needs to be undertaken before a strict deadline can be made. Basing their 
judgement on the experience of the European Union countries and their understanding of the 
considerable economic and political differences that exist within the East African countries, they 
were of the view that at least 15 years were required to achieve a fully functional customs union and 
that another 10 years would be necessary to achieve a common market. They suggested that the best 
way forward would be to encourage the enhanced participation of the private sector and to support 
regional economic and infrastructural development programmes and institution-building initiatives. 
Academics 
All respondents from academia said that the time plan for the achievement of the various aspects of 
integration is unrealistic. They felt that the integration programme was an “elite project” and people 
with “vested political interest” were driving the fast-track proposals.  They felt that there was a lack 
of analytical understanding of the political and economic situation obtaining in the three East 
African countries and that the political pronouncements were not backed by adequate economic 
analysis and financial commitment. The respondents generally felt that unless the process was based 
on serious analysis and recommendations, any resultant common market would most likely be 
fragile and non-sustainable. It was acknowledged that a building-block approach would be more 
appropriate and that having a definite time-line was not a feasible option. 
Fast-track committee members 
The three members of the fast-track committee (one from each country) were unanimous that: (i) 
they produced the report to respond to a “political decision”; (ii) the integration ideal is noble and 
should be vigorously but cautiously pursued; (iii) the time-scale for the realisation of both the 
customs union and the common market was not feasible; (iv) there were numerous political and 
economic divergences among the three countries; (v) the ordinary politicians and technocrats were 
not sufficiently enthusiastic about the project because they “have something to lose”; and (vi) there 
are many building blocks that need to be worked on in order to lay a solid foundation for market 
integration. 
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Overall assessment 
The views expressed by various stakeholders clearly and unambiguously lead to the conclusion that: 
(i) a customs union and a common market are definitely beneficial for the region and hence a 
common market goal should be supported, enhanced and nurtured over a much longer time than 
prescribed in the fast-track report; (ii) a lot of commendable progress has been made, especially 
with regard to the customs union protocol but the time frame is definitely not realistic; (iii) there 
exists asymmetry in both the political and economic realms of the three countries; (iv) there is need 
to take time and deliberately work on economic policy convergence modalities as well as building a 
common institutional framework to facilitate and co-ordinate market integration; (iv) there are 
transitional elements, issues and perceptions associated with a faster integration process which need 
to be identified and addressed; (v) discussion about the implementation of the customs union and 
the protocols for the common market are left to government bureaucrats who do not have authority 
to make real decisions; (iv) there is lack of well researched and analysed empirical evidence on key 
issues to inform decisions, leaving critical decisions to be made on the basis of perceptions; and 
(viii) a longer time frame is necessary, say 20-25 years, to achieve a functional and sustainable 
common market with the full realisation of a customs union in 15 to 20 years; and (viii) there are 
transitional issues, e.g. differences in the pace of implementation of agreed activities, which must be 
solved. 
 
Thus, while some programme activities are being implemented successfully and a determined 
political push is needed and necessary, a gradual building-block approach with clearly defined 
priority areas (such as the abolition of paper/visa requirements at border points, seamless 
transportation services, regional road network and infrastructural and institutional development) and 
a longer time frame (beyond 2010) is considered by an overwhelming majority of respondents to be 
the most optimal process towards market integration. 
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5. The monetary union 
According to the 2001-2005 EAC development plan the successful implementation of a monetary 
union will overcome the country-specific weaknesses and lead to greater macro-economic stability, 
greater regional integration, and rapid economic growth. 
 
A study by the IMF defines a monetary union in relation to the following characteristics: (i) a single 
or several currencies fully convertible at immutably fixed exchange rates; (ii) an arrangement 
whereby monetary policy is determined at the union level, allowing no national autonomy in 
monetary policy; and (iii) a single exchange rate policy with a common pool of external reserves of 
the members. In essence, it is situation whereby a single monetary policy prevails and inside which 
a single currency or currencies are perfect substitutes.7 In a related study, Chipeta and Mkandawire 
explain a monetary union as the use of a common currency and the existence of permanently fixed 
and rigid exchange rate relationships between currencies; a common fiscal and monetary policy; a 
central management of the common pool of foreign exchange reserves, external debts and exchange 
rate policy; the existence a regional monetary authority which is the sole issuer of a full currency; 
harmonisation of domestic credit that can be achieved by imposition of the central monetary 
authority; and a common development bank that can assist to finance regional and national 
projects.8 
 
An assessment of the attainability of a monetary union should be based on the above ideals. The 
fast-track report raised several key issues which must be dealt with in order to accelerate the 
achievement of a monetary union. They included: (i) the need to change the central banks into one 
bank as a regional monetary authority and create a common currency for all the countries; (ii) the 
need for convergent and similar macro-economic policies such as inflation targets, GDP growth 
rates, fiscal deficit, balance of payments, exchange rates and financial sector stability; (iii) 
recognition that strong dependence of foreign aid is a great impediment to achieving this goal, since 
it poses questions of sustainability of the balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves, stable 
exchange rate, and interest rates; and (iv) such common market conditions which are to be achieved 
prior to the monetary union, (e.g. free movement of persons, labour, capital, and services) may be 
difficult to achieve. Notwithstanding these challenges, the fast-track report suggested the following 
road map: 
 
Table 2: Road map for the monetary union 
Activity  Time of Completion  
Submit to design the ministers of finance as the interim monetary authority April 2005 
Establishment of the East African Monetary Policy Committee April 2005 
Submission by the monetary policy co-ordination committee of the draft 
proposal for an East African Central Bank Bill 
December 2005 
Submission of the draft bill to the Council March 2006 
Submission of the draft bill to the Summit April 2006 
Submission of the draft bill to the three parliaments by the minister of finance October 2006 
Passage of the bill by each of the parliaments December 2007 
Issue of new East African currency December 2009 
 
                                                 
7 International Monetary Fund (Africa Department), Monetary Union among Members of the East Africa 
Community: Preconditions and Policy Directions, Washington D.C.: IMF, 2004. 
8 Chipeta, C. and M.L. Mkandawire, Monetary Harmonization in Southern Africa, Nairobi: African Economic 
Research Consortium, Research Report No. 30, 1994. 
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It is noted that although there are regular meetings of central bank governors and technocrats, it has 
not been possible to adhere to the roadmap proposed for the attainment of a monetary union. In 
addition, our interviews with stakeholders revealed that, although some progress has been made in 
some areas (e.g. currency convertibility, liberalisation of the financial sector and close liaison of the 
capital markets), there still exist practical legal and institutional challenges and impediments that 
would require a much longer time to resolve. It is not feasible, therefore, to achieve a monetary 
union by 2009. 
 
The achievement of this goal faces serious challenges. The first one is whether macro-economic 
polices should be implemented gradually or by shock therapy. Approaches to a monetary union 
entail (i) a shock approach which means a quick move towards a monetary union with a 
corresponding (ii) strong pressure for structural and institutional adjustment, and (iii) a gradualist 
approach that gives room for lags and allows compatibility of member countries so as to achieve 
both the objectives and instruments.9  
 
Second, Masson and Pattillo stipulate that the key aspects of monetary integration include 
harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as money and capital markets. Thus, 
economic integration that relegates the monetary aspects to the background while establishing a 
custom union, as a first step, is bound to face the problem of foot-dragging when it finally decides 
to return to the territory of monetary integration. 10 Third, the varying exchange rate regimes present 
a policy dilemma to the proponents of a monetary union.11  
 
Finally, a study by the IMF on monetary union among East African partner states concludes that, (i) 
the EAC countries are diverse, conditions vary over space and time and essentially, the conditions 
of attaining a monetary union are not yet fulfilled; (ii) the achievement of the convergence criteria is 
not a “sufficient condition for monetary union” and there are concerns centred around the necessary 
institutional and policy frameworks; and (iii) achieving a monetary union should be seen as a long-
term project rather than being rushed.12 Therefore, successful implementation of a monetary union 
entails having a common legal and institutional framework, mechanism for the eventual effective 
design and implementation of the exchange rate policies and member states should draw a timeline 
setting out the various institutional changes that need to be undertaken. 
                                                 
9 Sheriffdeen, A., Monetary Union in Practice: Lessons from European Union, 1992. 
10 Masson, Paul and Catherine A. Pattillo, Monetary Union in West Africa (ECOWAS): Is Desirable, how 
could it be Achieved?  Occasional Paper No. 204, Washington D.C.: IMF, 2001. 
11 Kenya embraces a managed floating exchange rate regime, while Uganda’s and Tanzania’s exchange rate 
regimes are purely market driven. 
12 International Monetary Fund (Africa Department), Monetary Union among Members of the East Africa 
Community: Preconditions and Policy Directions, Washington D.C.: IMF, 2004. 
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6. Political federation 
In our above definition of a federation we stressed the point that it is a compound polity and that 
there is a defined division of responsibility between the components or tiers of government. 
However, the precise nature of that functional and jurisdictional division is a matter of 
constitutional design resulting from negotiation between stakeholders. It was also emphasised that 
the very design of a federation may be critical for its survival, particularly how it addresses the 
distribution of cost and benefits in the short and long run. Furthermore, empowerment by the 
citizens through direct elections was seen as a legitimising pre-requisite to make it sustainable. 
 
The fast-track report dealt with all these issues and discussed them in some detail. While 
acknowledging the intricacies of the design question, it went some way in making tentative 
suggestions as to the exclusive and concurrent functional and jurisdictional responsibilities of the 
federal and national tiers, respectively. It also discussed modes of representation, consultation, 
policy-making, and conflict resolution within the federation. In charting the way forward the fast-
track committee suggested that a 15-member commission be set up to draft a constitution for the 
East African federation with all the intricacies it would involve. 
 
Within a federal dispensation defining the roles of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) 
and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) is among the challenges to be addressed. At present 
the relationship between EALA and the national assemblies is problematic. There is regular 
exchange of information, including EALA reports submitted to the respective ministries of foreign 
affairs. But the national assemblies rarely debate EALA reports or other regional affairs for that 
matter, largely because domestic politics is inward-looking. To enhance interaction successful 
attempt have been made to create inter-parliamentary liaison committees in substantive areas as 
informal constructs. EALA members are elected for a five-year term and may be re-elected once. 
The first five-year term will expire in November 2006. The number of sitting days per year is 60. 
Although EALA is mandated to legislate across the board, so far only one substantive bill has been 
enacted into law: the EAC Customs Management Act 2004. 
 
A judiciary is required in any modern polity. So far the EACJ has lived a marginal existence, 
largely because of its restricted mandate. It is to adjudicate in cases involving disputes over the 
interpretation of the Treaty. To date the EACJ has not heard a single case and in the view of some 
lawyers it has become an ‘endangered species’.13 The lack of demand for adjudication so far is 
partly a reflection of the still low level of integration. However, with more regional legal 
instruments beyond the Treaty itself the number of cases brought before the EACJ is likely to 
increase. Thus far there is only the EAC Customs Management Act and as the implementation of 
the customs protocol progresses one might see disputes arising. Unless the jurisdiction of the EACJ 
is broadened to include adjudication in commercial disputes and/or human rights cases, it runs the 
risk of becoming totally moribund.  
 
The East African heads of state at the extraordinary summit in Dar es Salaam on 29-30 May 2005 
considered the report of the fast-track committee and reiterated their support for the principle of 
acceleration and fast-tracking the federation. However, they also noted that a strong federation 
would only be possible if it was owned by the people of East Africa. Hence, they underscored the 
need for wider consultations with all key stakeholders to obtain more views and comments on the 
best way forward to the political federation stage. The summit thus directed the council of ministers 
                                                 
13 Standard , 20 August 2005. 
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to form national consultative mechanisms and to collect views from the people of East Africa and 
report back to the summit the outcome of the consultations in twelve months.14 While the heads of 
state concurred with the thrust of the committee’s proposals to fast-track integration, it is interesting 
to note that, in effect, they applied brakes to slow down the speed somewhat in the interest of 
increased popular ownership. There is reason to believe that among the reasons for the 12-month 
consultation period were also the upcoming general elections in Tanzania and Uganda, slated for 
November 2005 and March 2006, respectively. During this time the political establishments of 
those countries will be preoccupied with national issues.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the heads of state agreed to appoint ministers solely responsible for EAC 
affairs – though resident in the capitals, not in Arusha as proposed by the committee – as a means of 
expediting the regional integration process. They also agreed to establish a post of deputy secretary-
general of the EAC to oversee and co-ordinate the fast-tracking process towards a federation. 
 
The National Assembly of Kenya debated and approved the fast-track committee report on 3 May 
2005, despite the fact that only a small number of MPs were in attendance. The report was never 
tabled in the Ugandan parliament and only approved by the executive branch. In Tanzania the 
Bunge debated the report and rejected it.  
Stakeholders’ views 
We solicited the views of a range of stakeholders as listed in appendix 3. Although there are 
nuances of view within each of the categories of respondents, we find it useful to group them as 
follows by collective characteristics and broad commonality of view: (a) civil servants and 
technocrats; (b) business community; (c) EAC secretariat staff; (d) diplomats and donor 
representatives; (e) academics; and (f) fast-track committee members.  
Civil servants and technocrats 
Among this group of interviewee there are distinctions between sectors and generations. It is 
unsurprising that respondents tend to see their own sectors as particularly important and to give high 
priority to their sector-specific projects. Regardless of sector affiliation, the younger civil servants 
tend to see the old guard as cautious and conservative, steeped in the legacy and stereotypes of the 
past. The historical spectre of the 1977 collapse lingers in their minds. The younger ones tend to be 
less risk-averse because they do not have personal experiences of past problems with integration 
efforts. The belief in the East African integration project is firm for young and old alike and across 
sectors. They may even like the fast-track idea in principle but they differ somewhat with regard to 
modalities and tempo.  
 
Notwithstanding these differences, civil servants generally find the committee’s time schedule for a 
political federation too optimistic. On occasion, they make caustic remarks about politicians whom 
they see as lacking in commitment and will. One senior civil servant even characterised the political 
federation time table as “utter rubbish”. Another saw statements of political intent as mere “hot air”. 
Many see the fast-track initiative as politically driven by people who are looking for political gains. 
The majority of politicians are nationa lly orientated. Politics is where the votes are and thus far no 
votes are to be had from an East African platform. Consequently, parochial issues take precedence 
over EAC issues which are hardly present at all in election campaigns. 
 
                                                 
14 Third Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State of the East African Community, Joint Communiqué, Dar es 
Salaam, 30 May 2005. 
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The technocrats attach more importance to the contributions made by many building blocks en 
route to a political federation. Still, they do not see enough evidence that political declarations are 
translated into concrete measures. Since there is lack of serious political commitment there is no 
other option than a step-by-step approach, even if political pressure can be useful at times to the 
extent it is actually exerted. But generally bureaucrats are wary of politicians. As one respondent 
put it: “Let the parts lead to the end result [i.e. federation]. Get the economics right first, then 
politics will follow. But don’t fast-track politics!” Some are also hesitant that institutional 
development is amenable to fast-tracking. Normally, institution-building is a meticulous process. 
Most acknowledge, nonetheless, that the building-block approach is not purely technical in nature; 
essentially it is political. As a result, the civil servants are prepared for an uneven stop-go process in 
which three steps may be taken forward only to be followed by two steps back again, etc. Being 
involved on a sector basis they often have first-hand experience with the challenges involved in 
thrashing out the nitty-gritty details of integration efforts. That is probably why they are sceptical to 
a premature political federation before its economic foundation is solid.  
 
It seems that the majority of the bureaucrats and technocrats of the civil services of the partner 
states are by and large satisfied with the progress made so far and would prefer to continue 
relentlessly along the same path; establishing a premature political federation would only divert 
attention from the building blocks. Or worse, forcing on the political federation might lead to a 
backlash and a new collapse, leading to despondency and distrust from which it would be even 
more difficult to recover than the events of 1977. 
 
To summarise, the civil servants have noted good progress and they feel the direction is right. On 
the other hand, they see the need for more education and sensitisation among the general population 
about East African integration. Finally, they think the time horizon needs to be longer; the time 
frame is not most important but rather the priorities and the sequencing of measures. A political 
federation is not feasible by 2010 – probably not even necessary by that early date.  
Business community 
The business community is impatient and stress practical measures on the ground as a means of 
fast-tracking East African integration. It subscribes solidly to the piecemeal building block 
approach. The three chambers of commerce and industry have already been federated as one 
contribution to the overall integration process! Politicians and technocrats alike are often seen as 
impediments to faster integration. The frequent postponement of meetings is indicative of lack of 
serious commitment on the part of politicians. The mindset of the civil service is claimed not to be 
conducive to the integration effort because it is risk-averse. Civil servants have been taught to 
uphold rules and regulations, not to produce results.  
 
Businesspeople take an interest in a political federation only in so far as it contributes to creating an 
economic policy environment conducive to growth and cross-border investment and trade. To the 
extent a political federation can be used as a vehicle for removing impediments to intra-regional 
economic activities the business community embraces the idea.  
 
The political superstructure is considered secondary to the many small and large building blocks 
towards one single market of all factors of production: economic integration is paramount. As one 
representative of the business community expressed it: “To us political integration is neither here 
nor there.” Another put it in graphic terms: “One cannot start building the roof of a house in mid-air 
without the foundation and walls it is supposed to rest upon.” In the opinion of the business 
community a political federation by 2010 is not feasible and may not even be necessary for 
promoting business ventures, even though it is recognised that a political push may be critical in 
moving the business agenda forward. 
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EAC secretariat staff 
EAC secretariat staff work close to the integration process on a daily basis and can thus be expected 
to encounter the many challenges involved. It is particularly noteworthy therefore, that also this 
group of respondents find a political federation by 2010 unrealistic. EAC staff do recognise that it is 
good to be ambitious and that time frames and targets are useful to strive towards. But if the targets 
are over-ambitious they do not serve that laudable purpose. Most of them are reasonably confident 
that the implementation of the customs union is progressing well, despite hiccups now and then. 
They see the protocol negotiations over the free move of persons, capital, and the rights of 
establishment and residence as a far greater challenge. These involve very sensitive matters and 
bring to the fore a host of disparities within the region. And some put the time period needed for a 
monetary union to be implemented at minimum ten years from the decision date. By implication, if 
the political federation is to complete the integration project, the 2010 date is not advisable. Some 
solace is taken in the increasing international recognition of the EAC and in its formal recognition 
as a grouping within the AU. 
 
There is also concern that the forthcoming elections in Tanzania and Uganda will delay the 
appointment of the commission to draft the EAC constitution. Similarly, there is uncertainty about 
the implications of the outcome of those electoral processes. The presidential candidate of the 
incumbent party in Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, is set to win but one is uncertain about his regional 
orientation towards COMESA vs. SADC. In short, there is some unease about the volatility of the 
political dynamics in the partner countries. This may, in turn, impact on the feasibility of the 2010 
deadline for the political federation. 
 
Another source of concern is the state of awareness of East African affairs among the general 
population. One staff member voiced the view that few realise that sensitising the population is a 
very long haul indeed, because it is difficult to fast-track the change of attitudes and perceptions. 
The ministries that the heads of state directed to consult are ill equipped for the task because they do 
not have a clue about how civil society works. The task of creating a new identity as East African as 
opposed to Kenyans, Tanzanians and Ugandans is daunting and will require a long time to come to 
fruition. At present no notion of East African-ness exists among the populace. Rather, nationalism 
and ethnicity are far more prevalent. Still, EAC staff members believe the community can be used 
as a vehicle for defeating nationalist thinking.   
 
Although the secretariat feels overstretched and badly in need of reinforcement, staff also take a 
certain pride in moving so fast that the rest of the organisation can hardly keep up. At times, 
however, complaints are heard that the secretariat is so bogged down in meetings and nitty-gritty 
planning that it hardly finds time to think strategically. Nevertheless, the staff feel that the strategic 
direction is correct, although they may have reservations about the realism of the time schedules 
suggested by the fast-track committee. 
Diplomats and donor representatives 
The diplomatic and donor community observe the integration project from the outside, while also 
being participants by virtue of their financial and other support. Overall, the donor community takes 
a sympathetic attitude to regional integration, even though it may have some reservations about 
certain aspects. These reservations stem largely from experiences from the donors’ home bases, 
which to varying degrees are relevant to the situation at hand in East Africa. On occasion, some 
donors may express views which are considered inappropriate and tantamount to undue 
interference. For instance, Tanzania took strong exception to the ‘advice’ offered by the EC Head of 
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Delegation to the effect that the country should pull out of SADC and rejoin COMESA.15 Although 
the remark was not intended to question Tanzania’s national sovereignty to determine foreign policy 
its meaning was construed differently in the circumstances. 
 
One diplomat ventured the view that the premature establishment of a political federation might 
create more problems than it would solve. It would be important for the partner countries to get 
their own houses in order first before moving to the federal level. Pending a political federation, 
whatever the time frame, the practical and economic programmes could move ahead, albeit at a 
slow pace. He felt that the EALA should be given more and clearer authority, though short of 
federal powers. Another diplomat found it hard to grasp what role EALA really has; its legitimacy 
is in doubt because there are no accountability mechanisms. In the case of the Kenyan members of 
EALA the anomaly exists that they were appointed by the KANU government while NARC is 
currently the incumbent coalition. As a result, the latter’s trust in Kenya’s EALA members is 
limited. 
 
The donor community is concerned about the overlap and duplication of effort inherent in multiple 
memberships in regional organisations. In the case of Tanzania, simultaneous membership in SADC 
and EAC, both with a common external tariff, is inconsistent and logically impossible. Otherwise, 
multiple memberships are capacity-demanding with scores of meetings without clear priority. The 
progress of the EAC project, with which this report is concerned, suffers as a result. 
 
From the point of view of the EAC as a recipient of donor funds, co-ordination of donor policy 
positions and practices is very important. It would be a great advantage if the donors could agree on 
a common assistance strategy whereby their contributions could become truly complementary rather 
than partly competitive. Most donors subscribe to this view but it is slow in being acted upon. The 
proposed development fund could provide the needed vehicle for greater donor co-ordination. 
Academics 
Similar to most other groups of respondent the academics subscribe to the building-block approach 
to integration. They find the concept of political federation to be sound and a noble goal but do not 
consider the political environment to be ripe yet. There is no successful precedent anywhere in the 
world where a political federation has preceded economic integration. Most of the respondents in 
this category focused on the building blocks in the economic sphere: make sure first that the 
customs union work; then move on to ensure that economic policies converge; and thereafter focus 
on cross-border investment to create a single investment area. Parallel to the above major sub-
projects of integration, all academics found it sensible to forge ahead with sectoral programmes in 
infrastructure, social sectors, management of common resources, etc. One respondent asked the 
following question and answered himself in the same breath: “Are we better off moving slowly and 
more thoroughly or forging ahead faster and more superficially. I prefer the former option; the latter 
may create a lot of dust, but we are still left with the same potholes.” 
 
Cognizant of historical experiences, however, the academic community was preoccupied with the 
distribution of costs and benefits among the partner states. They all considered it critical to redress 
disparities of the past and to institute mechanism for their prevention in the future. 
 
In order to move to the federal stage, all academic respondents underscored the need for 
harmonisation of political systems, e.g. the election cycles. At present there are democratic deficits 
in some countries and internal problems of stability in others. The unresolved conflict in northern 
Uganda was seen as a destabilising factor. Similarly, the Zanzibar problem in Tanzania is living 
                                                 
15 East African, 16–22 May 2005. 
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proof that unions are not easy to forge. Although Uganda voted overwhelmingly in favour of a 
multi-party system in the 28 July 2005 referendum, the recent change of the constitution to allow 
the incumbent president to stand again for a third term has raised concern in the partner states, 
particularly in Tanzania.16 The ongoing constitutional wrangles in Kenya suggest that governance 
problems are rife there as well. All is not well in the human rights field either.17 And the spectre of 
corruption is lurking everywhere. 
 
One respondent pointed out that there is a disjuncture between national electoral politics and East 
African thinking. In national politics there is a rise of ethnicity and parochialism leading to inward-
looking electorates and the withdrawal of local communities. Centrifugal and centripetal forces 
seem to be operating at the same time. The former is producing smaller sub-national units such as 
the increasing number of districts in Uganda.18 The latter includes moves towards larger units such 
as the East African federation. It is hard to say which of these forces are stronger but it seems that 
the centrifugal tendencies have the upper hand at the moment. 
 
Most academics concede that the East African federation is an elitist project, even though they find 
it appealing as such. So far the grassroots hardly have an inkling what a federation is about. The 
academics echo the concerns of all other categories of interviewee that the process of integration is 
not yet owned by the peoples of East Africa. The avant-garde of politicians and civil servants are so 
far ahead of the rank and file that they lose contact with reality. The fast-track report only served to 
legitimise and endorse political decisions already made. Even though the gap is too wide at the 
moment the academics do think that a political push is necessary in bridging it. Political will is 
important, but one respondent warned against the danger of exaggerating how much a federation 
can do. 
 
None of the academics finds the 2010 date for a political federation feasible. For starters, in the next 
6-8 months Tanzania and Uganda will be preoccupied with domestic elections. This will no doubt 
cause loss of momentum and delays in many arenas and effectively suspend regional activities. In 
principle, had domestic politics not been so singularly orientated towards parochial issues, the 
election campaigns might have provided excellent opportunities for creating an East African 
consciousness. But no politician seeking re-election would be so foolhardy as to promote East 
African policy issues. Besides, there are many imponderables in politics; “it’s not a military parade” 
as one respondent phrased it. Indeed! 
 
At the regional level the EALA is in place. But its members are not directly elected and the 
accountability and reporting mechanisms are deficient. At the moment the EALA country chapters 
report to their respective National Assemblies’ Foreign Affairs Committees but none of the reports 
has been debated by the National Assemblies. There appears to be a delinking of regional and 
national parliamentary arenas. 
Fast-track committee members 
It is significant that even the members of the fast-tracking committee themselves are in doubt about 
the feasibility of establishing a political federation by 2010. It should be recalled that the fast-track 
report was a collective product involving compromise. The dates and time tables were put in to 
accommodate pressure from the heads of state, not because all the committee members really 
believed in their realism. The committee members interviewed see the difficulties encountered in 
the economic sphere as the main hurdles. The implementation of the customs union protocol was 
                                                 
16 Sunday Monitor, 31 July 2005; Sunday Standard , 24 July 2005; Citizen, 17 August 2005. 
17 East African, 7–13 March 2005. 
18 New Vision, 8 August 2005. 
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seen as a milestone and the test case of a political federation because the behaviour of the partner 
states during the implementation phase would be indicative of real political commitment. A second 
test case of a political federation is the negotiations for a protocol on the free movement of labour 
and rights of establishment and residence; a political federation is not feasible without free 
movement across borders. Besides, one of the fundamentals of a federation is involvement of 
populations, and East Africa is still far from that goal. 
Overall assessment by respondents 
Our interviews revealed with great clarity that hardly anybody saw the 1 January 2010 target date 
for a political federation as a feasible proposition. Some were even astounded by the very question. 
At one extreme one respondent indicated 2050 as a more likely date, others considered 2025 as a 
reasonable time frame, and some just added five or ten years to the committee’s target date. One 
centrally placed bureaucrat suggested processes in four consecutive stages, each of five years’ 
duration:  
 
2005-2010 Implementing the customs union protocol; 
2010-2015 Laying the ground for a common market; 
2015-2020 Preparing for the monetary union; 
2020-2025 Towards the East African Federation. 
 
Almost without exception the interviewees subscribed to the gradual building-block approach and 
favoured starting with measures that would build legitimacy from below by removing existing 
impediments to regional interaction and thus improving the lives of the citizens of East Africa. Only 
then would the integration project gain the necessary credibility. They saw the demonstration of 
tangible benefits for various constituencies as the litmus test of success, not a political 
superstructure remote from the grassroots. 
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7. Conclusion 
To summarise, all our respondents are supportive of the integration process currently under way in 
East Africa. Without exception they see great potential in the deepening of integration for 
enhancing production and trade across borders. In turn, an economic growth process is a pre-
requisite for poverty reduction and holds great promise for alleviating the drudgery of the daily lives 
of East Africans in years to come. Most interviewees are agreed that great achievements have been 
made in an array of fields, the most notable one being the conclusion of the customs union protocol 
and the operationalisation of the Lake Victoria Basin Commission. In other words, the direction and 
substance of integration is not in question.  
 
However, in the same breath hardly any of our respondents considered as realistic the time frame 
proposed by the fast-track committee. Even the heads of state, at whose behest the fast-tracking 
committee was formed in the first place, appear to have had some reservations when they directed 
more consultations to be held with key stakeholders. Without being unduly pessimistic, let alone 
cynical, the majority of the stakeholders subscribes to the building-block approach to integration. 
They favour the implementation of an array of measures, not in a haphazard manner but in a 
coherent, complementary and sequential fashion guided by the development strategy of the EAC. 
 
Most stakeholders saw major challenges in negotiating a protocol on the free movement of persons, 
labour, services, goods and the right of establishment and residence. As a result, a more realistic 
time horizon would be needed. The same applies to the monetary union. 
 
On the political front, all stakeholders acknowledge the lack of popular ownership of the process 
towards a political federation. Raising awareness among the general population is very time-
consuming. Second, in the immediate future the forthcoming elections in Tanzania and Uganda are 
likely to slow down the regional process because the political systems of the partner countries 
remain orientated towards domestic constituencies and issues. Third, the view is often voiced that 
all partner countries have – to varying degrees – democratic deficits or internal security problems. 
The recent decision to adopt a multi-party system in Uganda is offset against the constitutiona l 
amendment to allow the incumbent president to stand for yet another term. The ongoing 
constitutional wrangling in Kenya is a source of concern. In Tanzania, the Zanzibar issue continues 
to mar the political struggle. Northern Uganda is still a war zone and ethnic skirmishes have erupted 
in Karamoja and Marsabit. Against this backdrop, most respondents see the establishment of a 
political superstructure in the form of a federation as premature. Rather, each partner country is 
called upon to bring its own house in order before creating a superstructure which would be resting 
on a shaky foundation. 
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8. Recommendations 
In the context of the present report we find it justified to address recommendations both to the donor 
community, Norway in particular as the commissioning body for this study, and to the EAC as its 
partner. 
EAC constraints and absorptive capacity19 
Chapters 3-10 of the EAC Treaty deal with the administrative organs and institutions of the 
Community, most of which are assigned tasks of policy-making, guidance, oversight, adjudication, 
and control. The main executive burden is placed on the secretariat in Arusha. The relevant Articles 
66-73 list its principal officers and enumerate its functions. But they are silent on the size of the 
staff complement required to discharge its functions. It is understood that staffing will expand as 
responsibilities multiply so that the staff establishment at any point in time will be commensurate 
with the tasks at hand. 
 
In this regard, regional organisations are prone to three pitfalls. First, the tasks and responsibilities 
may expand much faster than the recruitment of additional personnel to keep pace. In such a 
scenario bottlenecks appear, slowing down progress. At present there is no doubt a capacity 
constraint at the EAC secretariat. One of the most common reasons why executive staff recruitment 
tends to lag behind is the inability or unwillingness of the partner states to foot the bill. The degree 
to which members agree to expand the staff complement in tandem with the expansion of tasks and 
responsibilities is, in effect, a good proxy measure of their commitment to the regional venture. The 
fast-track committee states that currently some 27 per cent of the EAC secretariat budget is covered 
by donors. This is a source of concern, especially since the secretariat is set to expand. To the extent 
that the committee’s proposal is feasible, income derived from customs duties could solve the 
problem. 
 
Second, the reverse situation might arise, i.e. that the secretariat takes on too large a project 
portfolio in a misguided eagerness to perform well in all areas. The inclination of member states to 
designate national projects as regional ones tends to reinforce such tendencies. Another culprit 
might be the donor community, only too willing to move along and provide the funding. The 
bureaucracy of the secretariat might thus expand too fast, breeding complacency to the point of 
becoming a top-heavy, bloated structure that places a financial burden on the organisation, without 
much to show for itself in terms of achievements. Despondency might result. It is definitely not our 
impression that such a description applies to the EAC secretariat at present. 
 
Third, the regional venture might become so popular with the donor community that its secretariat 
becomes overpopulated with expatriate advisors and seconded staff. In the short and medium term 
the result could easily be loss of control over its own agenda. In the long run such donor 
dependency would clearly not be sustainable. Although there are some expatriate advisers at the 
EAC secretariat at present, they are not so numerous that they are able to control the agenda. Still, 
the proportion of the budget that is donor-funded is worrisome. 
 
                                                 
19 One of the authors of the present report undertook a related study four years ago. This section draws on that 
earlier report because the issues raised remain relevant. See Arne Tostensen, Supporting East African 
Integration: Assessing the Potential for Norwegian Support to the East African Community, Bergen: Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, 2001. 
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Given the relative youth of the EAC, it is premature to judge which one of these pitfalls – or any of 
them at all – is more likely. But there is reason to be vigilant against such tendencies from the very 
start. The solution lies in an appropriate balance between tasks and capacity. There are at least two 
methods of guarding against the pitfalls. 
 
First, strict adherence to the subsidiarity principle would go a long way towards fending off 
attempts by partner states to ‘ride on the regionality wave’. Whenever project proposals are tabled 
they should be subjected to a regionality test and be rejected outright if they do not pass it. 
Challenges that can be handled at lower tiers of government should not be hoisted up to the regional 
level, just because funding is might be ‘easier’ at that level. 
 
Second, to prevent an overloaded project portfolio at the secretariat level the execution of projects 
should be delegated as far as possible to other actors. The autonomous regional organisations 
immediately suggest themselves. Currently there are only three of them: East African Development 
Bank; Inter-University Council for East Africa; and Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation. Others 
not formally affiliated to the EAC, such as the East African Business Council, the East African Law 
Society, and the East African Tourism Council, could be entrusted with similar tasks. Otherwise, a 
plethora of private sector companies and civil society organisations stand prepared to take on 
similar implementation tasks. Thus the secretariat could restrict itself to overseeing and guiding 
activities. 
 
In tune with the redefined role of the state, the EAC as an inter-governmental organisation should 
confine its role principally to the harmonisation of policies, facilitation of activities, co-ordination 
of plans, and generally to providing an enabling environment for productive actors to thrive. It 
should seek to forestall developments towards becoming a grand agency of project execution. 
 
The EAC secretariat is small but effective as far as we could judge, although at times it gets bogged 
down in meetings and administrative tasks that divert attention from priority tasks. The staff are 
committed to the objectives of the Community. But capacity is overstretched, dangerously close to 
overloading. It is clear that whatever its staff complement, the secretariat must be fundable by the 
partner states. 
The posture of the donor community 
The donor community is generally sympathetic to the regional integration project, although some 
may have reservations about modalities and priorities. Furthermore – notwithstanding the 
absorptive capacity constraints on the part of the EAC – donors also face administrative 
shortcomings. A case in point is Norway. However, using the capacity of all three embassies in Dar 
es Salaam, Nairobi and Kampala appears attractive, with the Dar embassy in the driving seat. It 
should be recalled that some of the autonomous regional organisations entrusted with project 
execution are based in Tanzania (East African Law Society) or Uganda (Inter-University Council 
for East Africa), or their chairs rotate between the partner states.  
 
Another politic option would be to ‘piggyback’ on other donors, either by delegating the 
management of specific projects or by participating in donor consortia led by other donors. It should 
be noted that Sida is the lead donor in the Lake Victoria Initiative consortium of donors. Similar 
arrangements are conceivable in other sectors. 
 
Apart from involvement in regional projects funded from NORAD’s regional budget votes, the 
bilateral country programmes should be regarded in the context of regional complementarity. 
‘Tilting’ country programmes to regional priorities is a good method of integrating country-specific 
interventions with regional objectives in a complementary fashion. For instance, construction of a 
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stretch of road that forms part of a regional transport corridor might be financed and managed at the 
country level. Similarly, installing hydroelectric power generation capacity at the country level 
could contribute substantially to a regional power market in line with the East African Power 
Master Plan, of which a regional distribution grid would be an integral part. The examples could be 
multiplied. When negotiating country programmes care should be taken to include in the 
delegations’ instructions that the regional dimension be accommodated. 
 
In the same vein, the EAC member states should be encouraged to infuse their national budgets and 
programmes with a regional dimension. 
 
It is also prudent to remind oneself that regional integration can only function well if the country-
specific preconditions are in place. It would be a delusion to think that regional interventions can be 
a substitute for interventions at the country level. 
The EAC Development Fund 
The newest development in the interface between the EAC and the donor community is the planned 
EAC Development Fund (recently renamed the Partnership Fund). In that regard, a concept paper 
was presented at the consultative meeting of the EAC and its development partners in Arusha on 4 
November 2004. 20 The basic idea is to pool resources provided by the EAC partner states and the 
development partners in order to finance programmes, projects and other activities to further the 
socio-economic development of the region. On a smaller scale a consultancy fund existed 
previously. The intention now is to increase the volume of the fund and to broaden it scope. Apart 
from increasing the pool of resources available for developing the EAC, the Fund is also intended to 
forestall the inconsistencies, overlaps, and even incompatibilities, of projects and programmes with 
the EAC’s overall agenda. As such the proposed Fund could become a much needed vehicle for 
better co-ordination of donor support and better alignment with the priorities established by the 
EAC, which would entail enhanced dialogue between the two parties. There is little doubt that the 
administrative transaction costs could also be brought down through this mechanism. 
 
The EAC would like to see this Fund as a form of basket funding without conditionalities attached 
by the donors, or earmarking for specific projects and programmes. As such one might say that the 
Fund could be compared to budget support at the national level. From the point of view of 
budgeting, a Fund would make much sense if adapted to the EAC budget cycle, i.e. from July 
through June. 
 
Draft rules and regulations have been worked out for the management of the Fund. They provide for 
a committee to oversee the Fund, consisting of one representative of the EAC appointed by the 
Secretary-General; one representative of each of the EAC partner states; and one representative 
from each development partner who has contributed to the Fund. The committee is to take decisions 
by consensus, which means, in effect, that any member has a veto right. The draft regulations state 
that contributions are to be made as grants and also provide for rules governing procurement, 
accounting and auditing, which would serve to allay most donor concerns about possible misuse. 
 
We find the proposed Development Fund an excellent initiative and would warmly recommend to 
the donors that they make contributions on a continuous basis for its capitalisation. However, in the 
medium and long term the danger of donor dependency must be addressed. The proposal of the fast-
track committee to use a percentage of customs revenue to finance the budget of the EAC is 
relevant in this regard; a proportion of that revenue could be put into the fund. It would be in the 
                                                 
20 Ahmada R. Ngemera, Concept Paper on the Proposed Establishment of the EAC Development Fund, 
Arusha, EAC-Development Partners Consultative Meeting, 4 November 2004. 
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interest of the donor community and the EAC alike to prevent the donor proportion of the Fund 
becoming too large. When establishing the Fund, an understanding could be worked out between 
the donor community and the EAC to the effect that the proportion of donors’ contributions does 
not go beyond a specific percentage. One might even contemplate a time schedule according to 
which the share of EAC money would increase as the share of donor contributions declines 
correspondingly. 
 
Although a Development Fund with basket funding is appealing and preferable, its establishment 
should not preclude donor funding on a programme-by-programme basis – even though it may in 
some measure undermine the very intention of pooling: better planning, donor co-ordination and 
reduction of transaction costs. Some donors, whether for domestic political reasons or otherwise, 
are disinclined to pool their aid with other donors. Unless the EAC is prepared to forego donor 
money offered outside the Fund facility, it should allow earmarking for specific projects, provided 
they are included on EAC’s priority list. That would only increase to total amount of available 
external resources for regional integration purposes. 
 
Donor support is not only about the provision of money. Equally important is institutional 
development to enable the EAC to handle the increasing inflow of funds in a planned, transparent 
and accountable manner. The absorptive capacity constraints facing the EAC secretariat have 
already been alluded to as an immediate concern. A first next step might be to undertake a thorough 
institutional diagnosis of the secretariat with a view to defining the needs more precisely. There is 
dire need for institution-building in a wide range of institutions being set up at the regional level. As 
the process of integration evolves the commensurate institutional needs will continue to grow.  
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Appendix 1: Demographic indicators for East African countries in 2005 
Countries Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
Population (millions) 33.8 36.8 27.3 
Population growth rate 2.56 1.83 3.31 
0-14 years   42.5% 44% 50.1% 
15-64 years 55.2% 53.4% 47.7% 
65 years and over 2.3% 2.6% 2.2% 
Median age 18.19 17.62 14.97 
Life expectancy at birth 47.9 45.2 51.59 
Fertility rate (births per woman) 4.96 5.06 6.74 
Infant mortality rate  61.8 98.54 67.83 
Birth rate 40.13 38.16 47.39 
Death rate 14.65 16.71 12.8 
Net migration rate 0.08 -3.11 -1.49 
Prevalence of HIV (% of population aged 15-49) 6.7 8.8 4.1 
People living with AIDS (millions) 1.2 1.6 0.53 
HIV/AIDS-deaths (’000) 150 160 78 
Literacy rate (adult males, aged 15 and above) 90.6 85.9 79.5 
Literacy rate (adult females, aged 15 and above) 79.7 70.7 60.4 
Surface area (sq. km) (’000) 580.4  945.1  241.0 
 
Source – The World Factbook, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, website; 
   http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.,tz., ug.html 
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Appendix 2: Selected macro-economic indicators for East African countries 
Country Year GDP 
(US$million) 
Growth 
Rate 
Inflation Exchange Rate/1 Budget 
Deficit/2 
Public Debt as a % of GDP Poverty/4 
  2000 9,833 -0.2 10.81 76.2 -2.9 54.0 56% 
  2001 9,995 1.1 13.47 78.6 -7.7 53.4  
Kenya 2002 10,098 1 20.47 78.7 -1.3 51.9  
  2003 14,828 2.8 9.8 76.13 -4.3 49.6  
  2004 16,542 4.3 11.62 77.34 -0.8 43.4  
          
  2000 5,800 5.5 2.8 1644.5 -9.7 58 38% 
  2001 5,800 5.1 2.0 1755.7 -2.2 62  
Uganda 2002 5,900 6.7 -0.3 1797.6 -5.7 62.2  
  2003 6,300 4.7 7.8 1935.3 -11.2 73.9  
  2004 7,600 5.7 3.7 1727  73.9*  
          
  2000 9100 5.7 5.9 800.4 -1.2 48.1* 36% 
  2001 9300 6.1 5.2 876.4 -1.5 55  
Tanzania 2002 9400 6.3 4.6 966.6 -9.7 92.0  
  2003 9200 7.1 4.4 1063 -5.1 74.5  
  2004 9700 6.3 7.8 1060  79.2  
         
/1 The exchange rate per US dollar      
/2 as a percentage of GDP      
/3 Percentage below the poverty line      
4/Refers to the percentage below the poverty line      
 
* Estimates 
Sources: Economic Surveys Various Issues (Kenya); Bank of Tanzania www.bot-tz.org; Bank of Uganda www.bou.or.ug 
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Appendix 3: Exports and imports of East African countries, 2001 (Million US$) 
  Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
 Exports Imports Trade 
Balance 
Exports Imports Trade 
Balance 
Exports Imports Trade 
Balance 
Total  2301 3631 -1330 764 1636 -872 334 1009 -675 
1. Share of Industrial 
Countries 
41 42 -1 53 38 15 76 28 48 
 European Union 32 27 8 37 25 12 65 22 43 
United States 8 8 0 3 4 -1 5 3 2 
Japan 1 5 -4 12 4 8 4 3 1 
Other - 2 -2 1 5 -4 2 0 2 
2. Developing Countries 58 57 1 47 62 -15 25 72 -47 
Africa 36 10 26 19 23 -4 8 57 -49 
East African Community 23 1 22 10 7 3 2 49 -47 
South Africa 1 7 -6 1 13 -12 1 7 -6 
Asia 12 18 -6 23 25 -2 9 11 -2 
Europe 1 1 0 2 1 1 7 1 6 
Middle East 7 26 -19 3 12 -9 2 3 -1 
Western Hemisphere 0 2 -2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
3. Intra Trade 393.4 16.13 377.26 36.7 171.9 -135.2 45.2 385.1 -339.7 
Tanzania 98.9 7.44 91.46 - - - N/A N/A N/A 
Uganda 294.5 8.69 285.8 N/A N/A N/A - - - 
Kenya - - - 36.7 171.9 -135.2 45.4  385.1 -339.7 
 
Source: World Bank Estimates (2005), in: McIntyre M.A., “Trade Integration in the East African Community, 
An Assessment for Kenya”, IMF Working Paper, No. 05/143  
The World Factbook, (2005) Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, website;  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.,tz., ug.html 
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Appendix 4: Persons consulted 
Abuka, Charles A., Assistant Director, Research Department, Bank of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda 
Anyang’ Nyong’o, Peter, Minister of Economic Planning and National Development, Nairobi, 
Kenya 
Amani, Haidari K.R., Executive Director, Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania (member of the EAC fast-tracking committee) 
Bagamuhunda, Kenneth, Director of Customs, East African Community Secretariat, Arusha, 
Tanzania  
Banda, Dazydelian L., Professor, Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI), 
Arusha, Tanzania  
Baregu, Mwesiga L., Professor, Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, University of 
Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Bundi, Justin, Clerk, East African Legislative Assembly, Arusha, Tanzania  
Carpenter, Douglas, Counsellor (economics), Delegation of the European Commission, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania  
Cheluget, Kipyego, Deputy Secretary General (Projects & Programmes), East African Community 
Secretariat, Arusha, Tanzania  
Chemengich, Margaret, consultant, Nairobi, Kenya (member of the EAC fast-tracking committee) 
Dalen, Kjell Harald, Ambassador of Norway to Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya  
Gariyo, Zie, Technical Advisor, Uganda Debt Network, Kampala, Uganda 
Gjøs, Tore, Ambassador of Norway to Uganda, Kampala, Uganda 
Ikiara, Gerrishon K., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Transport, Nairobi, Kenya 
James, David L., Chief Credit Officer, East African Development Bank, Kampala, Uganda 
Kadeshe, Peter L., Deputy Director, Macro-economic & Financial Programme, Bank of Tanzania, 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Kalanje, Mariot M., Management Consultant (former Executive Director), Tanzania Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Kamajugo, Richard K., Assistant Commissioner Trade, Customs and Excise Dept., Uganda 
Revenue Authority, Kampala, Uganda  
Kanga, Maurice J.P., Economic Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Kenya 
Kassami, C.M., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
Kampala, Uganda 
Kiguta, Peter N., Director General (Customs & Trade), East African Community Secretariat, 
Arusha, Tanzania  
Kikwai, Susan, Acting Managing Director, Investment Promotion Centre, Nairobi, Kenya 
Kilato, Isaack H., Director, Economic Policy, Bank of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Kitillya, Harry M., Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Lam, Amanda Sunassee, Trade & Private Sector Expert, Ministry of Finance, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania  
Latif, Razi, Programme Officer (rural development), Delegation of the European Commission, Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania  
Lyakurwa, William, Executive Director, African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi, Kenya 
Magoola, Kalyebbi B., Assistant Commissioner Modernisation, Uganda Revenue Authority, 
Kampala, Uganda 
Makoffu, Mary N., Economist (Social Sector), East African Community Secretariat, Arusha, 
Tanzania  
Maliyamkono, T. L., Professor, Eastern and Southern African Universities Research Programme 
(ESAURP), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
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Masya, Japhet, consultant (former clerk of the Parliament of Kenya), Nairobi, Kenya 
Mazrui, Salma, Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), Nairobi, Kenya 
Mjema, G.D., Director, Economic Research Bureau (ERB), University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania  
Mwakibolwa, G.B., Deputy Director, International Economics Department, Directorate of 
Economic Policy, Bank of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Mwebesa, Chris, Chief Executive, Nairobi Stock Exchange, Kenya 
Muhakanizi, Keith J., Acting Deputy Secretary General to Treasury, Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development, Kampala, Uganda 
Muiruri, Peter G., Information and Public Relations Officer, Kenya National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Nairobi, Kenya 
Mutanda, Noella, Public Relations Officer, Investment Promotion Centre, Nairobi, Kenya 
Nalo, David S.O., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and National Development, Nairobi, 
Kenya 
Ng’eno, Nehemiah K., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Nairobi, Kenya 
Nordin, Kikki, Councellor, Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi, Kenya 
Nyella, Johnson J., Senior Economist, Monetary and Financial Affairs Dept., Bank of Tanzania, Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania 
Nyangito, Hezron, Acting Executive Director, Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and 
Analysis (KIPPRA), Nairobi, Kenya 
Nyinguro, Philip O., Senior Lecturer, Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, 
University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya 
Okidi, John Alphonse, Executive Director, Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), Kampala, 
Uganda 
Paukku, Jorma, Ambassador of Finland to Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Poloji, Dickson, Policy Analyst, Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), Nairobi, Kenya  
Rudaheranwa, Nichodemus, Senior Research Fellow, Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), 
Kampala, Uganda 
Ruhangisa, John E., Registrar, East African Court of Justice, Arusha, Tanzania  
Rutega, Simon S., Chief Executive Officer, Uganda Securities Exchange, Kampala, Uganda 
Rydland, Inge Herman, Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Sajjabi, M.D., Economist (Fiscal & Monetary), East African Community Secretariat, Arusha, 
Tanzania  
Semboja, Joseph, Executive Director, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania  
Spitzer, Hanno, Head of Division for Development Co-operation, Embassy of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania  
Ssali, Simba, Senior Lecturer, Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere 
University, Kampala, Uganda 
Thewa, D.D., Deputy Director Real Sector, Directorate of Economic Policy, Bank of Tanzania, Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania  
Tulya-Muhika, Sam, Director, International Development Consultants Ltd., Kampala, Uganda 
(member of the EAC fast-tracking committee) 
Tumusiime, Godfrey, Director General, East African Development Bank, Kampala, Uganda 
Tumusiime-Mutebile, Emmanuel, Governor, Bank of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda 
Urassa, Oswald M., Finance and Operations Manager, Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania  
Wagatharia, Micugu, Vice President, Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Nairobi, 
Kenya 
Wangwe, Samuel, M., Policy Advisor on Co-ordination of Reforms, President’s Office, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania  
Wambugu, Philip W., Transport Economist, East African Community Secretariat, Arusha, Tanzania  
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Appendix 5: Terms of reference 
Study on the Future Development of the East African Community (EAC) 
 
Background and purpose 
Norway has supported regional and sub-regional co-operation in Africa for many years and views 
the regional organisations as important partners in development for poverty alleviation and the quest 
for peace and security on the continent. While having broad based relations with SADC, AU, Nepad 
and IGAD Norwegian involvement with EAC has so far been limited to support to the EALA, to the 
Lake Victoria Management programme and to short term activities. Following recent developments 
in EAC, particularly the commencement of the customs union and the appointment of the Fast 
Track Committee, Norway is in a process of analysing the basis for a broader partnership with 
EAC.  
 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is to contribute to a better understanding of the potential for and realism in 
stronger integration among the East-African countries. The report shall provide a critical view on 
the technical challenges ahead and the political support for further integration and draw up various 
scenarios for the development of EAC. The study will form part of the background for discussions 
on future co-operation with EAC and will be shared with interested partners.  
 
The consultant shall  
1) Assess the support for the concept of the Federation of East Africa among the Heads of State and 
governments of the three member states. The consultant shall also assess of the technical and 
bureaucratic challenges in establishing the Federation.    
 
2) Assess the realism of the time frames set for concluding the protocols on Free Movement of 
Person, Labour, Services and Rights of Establishment and Residence, the Common Market and the 
Monetary Union. The potential problems of overlapping trade arrangements should be taken into 
account as well as the technical tasks involved. The political support and the interests of the 
business community should be analysed. 
 
Scope of work and timeframe 
The study will be based on a desk review of relevant available documents and interviews with 
relevant persons in the region. The consultant will visit all the three capitals and the EAC 
headquarter in Arusha.  
 
The study will start 1st August 2005.  
 
A draft report shall be submitted by CMI to the Regional Department of the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs with a copy to Norad not later than 30 August. The final report shall be submitted 
by 15 October 2005. 
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